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Abstrac Abstrac Abstrac Abstrac Abstract: This article examines the trajectory of the cotton industry,
including calico printing, over the period 1760-1900. From its beginnings in
England as a leading industry of the capitalist world-economy, it spread
geographically on a major scale to finally reach the United States and Japan.
Over the long term, it is argued that as it expanded and competition increased,
profit rates tended to fall, although unevenly.
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Introduction Introduction Introduction Introduction Introduction
The cotton industry has captured the attention of many scholarly studies because
of its assumed pivotal role in the industrial revolution in England. Our goal
here is not to debate the relevance of these studies; instead we are interested in
establishing the significance of cotton manufacture as a leading industry,
tracing its geographical expansion, and examining the trend in its profit rates.
From raw material transformed into yarn and cloth, cotton textiles, epitomized
as consumer products, have been the emblem of a sector of long-term global
influence on the world-economy.
Although cotton spinning is often perceived as the precursor of the cotton
industry, calico printing was also a prosperous sector organized at the factory
level. It began to flourish after 1760, once the ban on calico printing was
abolished in France and later in Great Britain. Mechanized spinning was the
second sector that eventually further developed the expansion of cotton
manufacture in the 1780’s. Finally, although weaving always played an integralThe Journal of Philosophical Economics IV:1 (Special issue 2010) 105
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role in the production process, mechanized weaving began to supplant handloom
production later on in the 1830’s (the last process to fully mechanize).
Regarding cotton manufacture, it is known that Britain, in particular
Lancashire, had been the first dominant center of production during the
industry’s expansion in the second half of the eighteenth century. Better suited
and more adaptable than jute or linen “for clothing or for furnishing,” cotton
became the fiber of choice for many. Its adaptability to machine production
offering cheaper products contributed as well to its popularity across the globe
(Farnie 2004: 17). Why the expansion of manufacture? Technical innovations
transformed the cotton industry. In spinning, the mechanization process, with
the Arkwright’s water system, had been established by the 1780’s; then mule
spinning, better suited for fine yarn, became widespread by the early 1800’s.[1]
Other innovative spinning mechanisms were introduced in the following decades,
always improving productivity. Weaving, on the other hand, mechanized later
and at a slower pace. Thus it was only in the mid-nineteenth century that the
number of powerlooms surpassed those of handlooms.[2] The decrease in price of
raw cotton from the southern United States, due in part to mechanical
innovation in the 1790’s, also permitted a reduction in the price of cotton yarn
and fabrics (Crouzet 1982: 195, 197-98). Furthermore, rising import duties
alleviated the burden of competition from “East Indian textiles”—tariffs against
Indian imports were augmented several times between 1797 and 1819 (Farnie
1979: 8, 96; Singleton 1997: 166; 2004: 60-61). Because of mechanical
innovations, cheaper finer cottons, and protection against foreign Indian
competition, Britain was able to attain its supremacy in cotton manufacture.
According to Deane,
By the time her rivals had followed her lead and were turning out comparable
products, prices had fallen to more competitive levels and the boom profits had been
won. … [I]t meant that the country which was first in building up the capacity and
the ancillary industries and the commercial contracts could go on getting higher-than
average profits for a considerable time, simply because it was enjoying larger
economies of scale and could go on supplying its products at keener prices (Deane
1965: 92).
For Britain, exports were central to cotton’s industrial growth. In this context,
the supremacy of the British navy in the late eighteenth century advantaged the
sale of cotton goods to overseas markets (see Singleton 2004). If, prior to the
1790’s, most production was certainly geared for home consumption, a largeFlorence Molk 106
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share of its production value was exported afterwards: it reached about 75
percent in 1805/06, stabilized to about 50 percent until 1840, and increased again
up to 67 percent between 1869/71 (Barr 2000: 139; Crouzet 1982: 194; Deane and
Cole 1967: 187).[3] Europe and the United States were the first export
destinations. Later on, Latin America, the Levant and Asia, particularly India
after “the abolition of the East India Company’s monopoly in 1813,” increasingly
acquired British cotton textiles (Crouzet 1982: 194; Farnie 1979: 90).
Whereas at the beginning of the nineteenth century the British cotton industry
represented only 4 or 5 per cent of the total national income or 7 or 8 per cent by
1812; its productivity expansion, nonetheless, surpassed the results obtained by
other manufacturing industries between 1780 and 1830 (Deane 1965: 88; Rose
2000: 22). Overall, British cotton manufacture, mostly concentrated in
Lancashire, increased its production at a rate of 7.4 percent per annum until
1840 when continental competition as well as other home industries started
eroding its established supremacy (Farnie 1979: 7-8; Boyson 1970: v, who dates
mid-nineteenth century as the turning point; Lloyd Jones and Le Roux 1980).
A more meticulous observation shows an unprecedented growth between the
Revolutionary and the Napoleonic Wars, “stimulated by expansion of foreign
trade and price inflation. The boom wartime conditions promoted the supremacy
of the British cotton industry, which in return recorded large profits” (Barr
2000: 140; see also Chapman 1979: 52). The period following 1815 witnessed
deceleration as well as increased competition, a trend that continued until the
1840’s.[4] The recovery and increase of exports in the 1850’s due to an increase in
demand from the United States, Australia, and Asia did not, however, bring
back pre-1815 preeminence (Barr 2000: 140; Farnie 1979: 135). According to
Crouzet, “after a slowing-down of growth during the 1840’s, the cotton industry,
which was called ‘the greatest manufacturing industry that has ever existed’,
then enjoyed a halcyon decade, with a big increase in cotton consumption and
massive investment, which dramatically enlarged its productive capacity while at
the same time improving productivity” (Crouzet 1982: 206). However, the eve of
the American Civil War marked a turning point for the British cotton industry
and, despite cyclical recoveries, it never recaptured its early in the century
prominence (Crouzet 1982: 108).
In the last quarter of the nineteenth century, the industry definitively lost its
competitive edge. Farnie summarizes as follows the post-1873 period.The Journal of Philosophical Economics IV:1 (Special issue 2010) 107
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The decrease in the industry’s rate of expansion was apparently the product less of
any secular decline in the quality of the entrepreneurship or any shortage of capital
than of the competition of low-cost competitors abroad, the long-term decline in
profits expectations, and the secular shift towards more competitive spheres of
production such as engineering (Farnie 1979: 187).
At first glance, the evolution of the British cotton industry roughly followed
the cyclical trends of the capitalist world-economy, whereby the pre-1815 period
corresponds to a period of growth and expansion, followed by contraction
between 1816 and 1850, with a recovery from 1851 to 1870, and again a
depression of prices after 1873. As we shall explore later in more detail, the
British cotton industry experienced growth and expansion, with high profit
returns, between 1780 and 1815, followed by a contraction until the 1840’s, and
recovery after the 1850’s, but even with cyclical upturns the industry never
recaptured its prominence.
Geographic expansion Geographic expansion Geographic expansion Geographic expansion Geographic expansion
While Britain was the primary and dominant center of production, the cotton
industry also expanded on the Continent (France, Germany, Belgium, Austro/
Hungary, and Switzerland) as well as the United States in the late eighteenth
and early nineteenth centuries. Before the Napoleonic wars,[5] the cotton
industry was fairly well established and successful in France, Switzerland,
Belgium, and the Ruhr-Saxony region (Germany) but was still dominated with
hand spinning and calico printing.[6] Machine spinning developed after 1796 in
France and other countries. This relatively slow but steady development was also
accompanied with a stiff British competition able to produce yarn at cheaper
and falling prices (Crouzet 1964: 575). But during the Continental blockade,
after 1806, the picture of the cotton industry changed to some extent. During
that period, British exports in general, and cotton yarns in particular were
prohibited from entering potential markets on the continent, thus preparing an
opportunity for some continental countries to further develop an indigenous
market.[7] In France, despite succeeding in keeping afloat the cotton industry
before the blockade, because of constant protection against British competition,
the volume of output increased until the end of the Empire, except in 1808 and
1811 (Crouzet 1964: 577). In Saxony, after facing stiff competition prior to 1806,
the industry was able to stabilize, however, without much increase in
production. In Belgium, the industry flourished until 1810, but then stagnatedFlorence Molk 108
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until 1815; picked up again after 1825, and finally faced serious difficulties in
the 1840’s (Voortman 1940: 122). Similarly, the continental blockade permitted
the Austro/Hungarian cotton industry to further expand without facing direct
British competition. It also faced a slump in the 1810’s and picked up somewhat
in the 1820’s (Good 1984: 50).[8] The Swiss industry (cotton printing and
muslin), accustomed to exporting its products had to send its production to
Germany instead of France because of strong protectionist measures. However,
other elements persisted to hamper the development of the continental cotton
industry. Certainly, the price of raw cotton continued to be higher on the
continent than in England. Crouzet estimates that the price of raw cotton after
1807 was between two to four times higher on the continent than in England
(Crouzet 1964: 578).[9] Furthermore, after the end of hostilities in 1814-15, the
British competition regained strength and destabilized production on the
continent, followed by a few bankruptcies.[10] Protective measures were again
installed and permitted the industry to continue its development.
The American cotton industry, unlike its counterpart in Europe, did not have a
tradition of domestic production (putting-out or artisan production), but produced
its main input, raw cotton. Since the quality of southern raw cotton improved
dramatically in the 1790’s, it became the major supplier of the nascent cotton
industry (Tucker 1984: 53). Cotton manufacture slowly took form after the arrival
from England of Samuel Slater in 1789. Equipped with know-how in machinery,
he became the associate of Almy and Brown who were among the first cotton
manufacturers in the United Sates (Ware 1931: 19; Tucker 1984). But the
development of the American cotton industry was rather slow, since by 1806 a total
of 15 mills were in operation, and half of them belonged to Slater and his
associates. The industry only became significant in the 1820’s (Rose 2000: 45). In
the early period prior to 1808, most cotton textiles were imported from England
(fine cotton) and India (coarse cotton),[11] but political events prompted the
government to interfere in trade. Because of hostilities between England and the
United States, the Jeffersonian embargo was imposed in 1807, and the war of 1812
further limited imports, which in turn facilitated the growth of a domestic
industry, principally in New England (Rose 2000: 46; Irwin and Temin 2000: 19).
At the end of hostilities between England and America in 1814, cheap products,
especially Indian textiles, entered the American market, jeopardizing the existence
of many cotton manufacturers already facing an economic slump, therefore
another set of protectionists measures concretized with the introduction of the
tariff of 1816 with a 35 percent ad valorem tax (Rose 2000: 47; Singleton 1997:The Journal of Philosophical Economics IV:1 (Special issue 2010) 109
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167). Finally in the 1820’s, the domestic cotton industry produced more output
than imported cotton goods (Irwin and Temin 2000: 21; Farnie 1979: 93). In the
United States, New England became the principal center of production, and since
then cotton manufacture continued to grow at a steady pace, supplying mainly its
internal market with coarse quality products. But other protectionists’ measures
were introduced in the following decades.
The northeastern states continued to maintain supremacy in cotton production until
the turn of the twentieth century. However, in the 1860’s, southern states began
operating cotton mills as well, but with limited impact. In 1900 while 41 percent of
national spindleage remained in Massachusetts, southern spindleage represented
20.76 percent of the national total (Yonekawa 1998: 19; Rose 2000: 180).[12]
Lastly, in the final two decades of the nineteenth century, industrial cotton
production spread to Asia. Cotton spinning manufacture reached Japan in the
1880’s, and it is argued that it remained its principal industry until the 1930’s
(Chokki 1998: 1; Farnie and Nakaoka 2000: 11). A few attempts had been made at
introducing mechanized spinning under the Meiji government, but most mills
had not been very successful.[13] Cotton spinning was the first branch of the
industry to introduce machinery followed by power loom weaving developing at
a slower pace and not making significant inroads until the First World War
(Koh 1966: 23).[14] However, by 1898 with the growth of cotton spinning,
Japan’s reliance upon Indian cotton yarn became minute and exports of yarn
exceeded total imports.[15] In the 1890’s Japan began exporting yarn to China as
a result of a slump in the domestic market (Koh 1966: 24). The Sino-Japanese
War (1894-95) followed by “two maritime laws” expanding “ocean
going-shipping” as well as “the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05” facilitated the
access to Chinese and Korean markets (Farnie and Nakaoka 2000: 29; Koh 1966:
24; Seki, 1956:19). By 1900, one third of Japanese production was destined for
export, and Japan surpassed the United States and India as a supplier of the
Chinese market in the 1910’s. Although still behind England, Japanese market
share represented 20 percent of Chinese imports (Takamura 1982: 277, 278).
Overall, by the early twentieth century the industry rivaled its competitors in
the world-economy (Fletcher 1998: 63).
Indian cotton goods, as discussed previously, lost their competitive edge once the
British introduced mechanized production along with tariff protection to defend
their market. The “modern” Indian cotton industry emerged in the mid-1850s with
the creation of the Bombay Spinning and Weaving Mill.[16] The industryFlorence Molk 110
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continued to develop at a steady pace, and eventually totaled “193 mills with
4,945,783 spindles and 40,124 looms” by 1900. The peculiarity of the Indian cotton
industry was the existence of “managing agency system” which provided both “the
financing required by the industry, in respect to both fixed and working capital,
and the day-to-day management of the industry.” Exports to China absorbed a
portion of the Indian cotton production; however, by 1914 Japan started to
out-compete India in the Chinese market. By the mid-1920’s, due to Japan’s
competition in the Chinese market, India turned to its national outlet with a
supply of fabrics and medium and fine yarns, although by the end of the First
World War, Japanese and British cotton goods still competed strongly for shares
of the Indian national market (Koh 1966: 99, 125-6, 148, 126-27).
Production totals Production totals Production totals Production totals Production totals
After this descriptive attempt at positioning cotton manufacture as a leading
industry first located in Britain and its subsequent geographical expansion, let
us now estimate worldwide total production over time. Amidst a lack of adequate
output figures, and since raw cotton constitutes the main input of the cotton
industry, we can obtain a fairly clear picture of its development by reporting
cotton consumption over the long term.[17]
The British cotton industry expanded quickly between 1780 and 1800,[18] whereby
fixed investments increased “by 165% to reach £ 4.9 m” (Mitchell 1988: 330; Rose
2000: 22). The United Kingdom consumed 3.0 thousand metric tons of raw cotton
in 1780 and reached 24 by 1800. During that same period of time, France
consumed an average of 4.0 thousand metric tons (Mitchell 1992: 427-28). While
the consumption of raw cotton quadrupled in Britain between 1790 and 1810, in
France it tripled (Crouzet 1990: 306). During the next period, 1800–1860, the
United Kingdom continued to augment its annual consumption of raw cotton to
reach a peak of 492 thousand metric tons, only to regain slow growth after 1870
(Mitchell 1992: 428).[19] In the meantime, France increased its average to arrive at
115 thousand metric tons in 1860. With reports beginning in the 1820’s, Austria
(Austria-Hungary) consumed 4.7 thousand metric tons, but steadily grew to 45
thousand metric tons by 1860. Germany averaged a consumption of 8.9 metric tons
in the late 1830s and reported a total of 67 thousand metric tons by 1860 (Mitchell
1992: 428-29). Also, by 1860 the United States consumed an average of 184
thousand of metric tons. This brief outlook regarding the amount of cotton
consumption between 1780 and 1860 demonstrates that the UK, France, Belgium,The Journal of Philosophical Economics IV:1 (Special issue 2010) 111
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Austria/Hungary, Germany and the United States participated in cotton
manufacture, with England leading the group.[20] In 1870, continuing the trend,
the UK persisted in the lead with raw cotton consumption equaling 489 thousand
metric tons, followed by the United States with 174 thousand metric tons,
Germany with 81 thousand metric tons, France with 59 thousand metric tons, and
Austria/Hungary with 45 thousand metric tons. The following decade, in 1880, the
tendency remained the same, recording bigger outputs for all of them. In 1890, for
the first time Japan showed figures of 22 thousand metric tons of cotton
consumption. Finally in 1900, the total amounted to 833 thousand metric tons in
the United States (surpassing for the first time the UK), 788 thousand metric tons
in the UK, 375 thousand metric tons in India,[21] 279 thousand metric tons in
Germany, 221 thousand metric tons in Japan, 159 thousand metric tons in France,
and 127 thousand metric tons in Austria/Hungary (Mitchell 1992). The post-1860’s
trend indicates the gradual growing importance of the United States, which
eventually surpassed the UK, and the prominence of Japan and India at the turn
of the twentieth century.
Table 1 Cotton Consumption 1820 - 1900 (total in thousands of metric tons)
1820 25.8%* 0.8% 73.3% n/a 73.6
1830 4.25% 20.0%* 1.2% 74.5% n/a 150.3
1840 4.0% 3.0% 17.8% 3.0%* 2.0% 70.0% n/a 296.8
1850 7.0% 2.43% 14.3% 6.3%* 4.8% 64.0% n/a 411
1865 3.7% 2.0% 10.2% 7.7% 0.5% 4.3% 4.0% 54.7% 12.5% n/a n/a 598.8
[22]
1870 4.7% 1.7% 6.1% 8.4% 1.6% 4.8% 3.9% 50.8% 18.0% n/a n/a 963
1880 4.5% 1.6% 6.2% 9.6% 3.3% 6.6% 1.5% 43.4% 23% n/a n/a 1,420
1890 5.0% 1.5% 6.0% 11.0% 4.9% 6.5% 1.3% 36.3% 26.4% n/a 1.0% 2,079
1900 4.4% 1.2% 5.6% 9.8% 4.3% 9.2% 0.8% 27.6% 28.1% n/a 4.5% 2,850
1910 4.7% 1.7% 4.2% 10.3% 4.7% 9.7% 0.6% 19.9% 28.1% 9.2% 6.6% 3,712
* average
Source: From Mitchell (1992, 1993); In Europe, Sweden and Finland (with a low
percentage), Spain (whose records start in the mid-1830’s) and the Netherlands (whose
records start in the 1840’s) are omitted; Latin America not included, as well.
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Another indicator of the relative importance of cotton manufacture can be
established through the number of spindles used in the industry. Based on
miscellaneous sources, we are able to establish factory spindleage from 1800.
While the UK possessed 95.4 percent of the total number of spindles in 1800, its
percentage decreased to 39.7 percent by 1910, indicating the geographic
expansion of the industry during the nineteenth century. Unlike cotton
consumption, total spindleage remained the largest in Great Britain over the
decades, despite a decrease in percentage. This can be partially explained by the
different technologies in use, mule spinning in Great Britain, and ring spinning
producing bigger output in the United States.[23]
Table 2 Factory Spindleage of the Cotton industry
Great Britain Continent America Asia Total Spindles
% % % % (millions)
1800 95.4 4.6 0.05 3.46
1810 82.2 16.4 1.3 7.30
1820 73.9 24.1 2.0 11.45
1830 69.0 24.5 6.5 16.95
1840 63.2 26.8 10.0 24.20
1850 60.6 27.4 11.8 34.63
1860 61.0 27.6 11.0 0.7 49.78
1870 57.6 29.3 12.3 0.73 60.19
1880 54.1 27.5 15.3 2.0 73.46
1890 49.6 28.6 17.8 4.0 88.29
1900 42.84 30.7 20.2 6.3 106.43
1910 39.7 30.4 23.3 6.6 134.45
From Farnie (1979: 180; 2004: 23-24), Koh (1966: 23, 325 and 334), Rose (2000: 162),
Takamura (1982: 279), Saxonhouse and Wright (1998: 276).[24]
Also particular to the cotton industry from its inception is a lack of
monopolistic firms, except in Japan where a few companies dominated the
market (see Chapman 1987: 26-35; Fitton and Wadsworth 1968: 192-196; Gatrell
1977; Loyd-Jones and Le Roux 1980; Rose 2000: 162, table 6.2; Koh 1966: 325-326
and tables 3-1: 365 and 3-3: 367). For example in Britain, with the introductionThe Journal of Philosophical Economics IV:1 (Special issue 2010) 113
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of the Arkwright-type mills in the late eighteenth century, the number of mills
augmented in comparison to earlier periods. A rough estimate (not all of the UK
was accounted for) recorded the existence of about 208 mills in 1788 (Chapman
1987: 27). In 1795, with the exception of a few large firms (owners among whom
we find the Peels with 23 mills and the Douglases and Robinsons) modest size
with small resources characterized the industry. The next industry survey of
1812 recorded the importance of mule spinning in many factories. Despite
technological innovations 70 percent of firms possessed less the 10,000 spindles.
In contrast, owners such as the Horrocks of Preston (107,000 spindles),
Marsland of Stokcport, M’Connel and Kennedy and A&G Murray (all with
80,000 spindles) represented the other end of the industry. All four firms
combined possessed 4.75 percent of worldwide spindleage based on the 1810
estimates.[25] Over the years, small manufactures continued to enter the
industry, especially during the 1820’s (Chapman 1987: 30).
Far behind Britain regarding cotton production, France, according to accounts,
possessed one mechanized cotton manufacture in 1780, 8 in 1790, 48 in 1800 and
272 in 1814 (Chassagne 1991: Tableau 8, 259). But if we add non-mechanized
spinning and weaving to the equation, we notice a far greater number of
establishments. For example, the Champagny’s survey of 1806 registered 1,037
spinning mills and 2,249 weaving mills (Chassagne 1991: Tableau 9, 269).
The estimated[26] spindleage of the Baker sample in the United States (see
discussion below) represented 5.7 percent of the country’s total and 0.6 percent of
worldwide total in 1850 to eventually reach a decade later 7 and 0.8 percents
respectively. In 1880, the former and latter amounted to 5.8 and 0.8 percents
(McGouldrick 1968: 248-249; Farnie 2004: 23).
One major company, the Osaka Spinning Co., established in 1882, is emblematic
of the expansion of cotton manufacture in Japan. With machines brought from
England through the Platt Brothers, mechanized spinning began expanding
steadily (Chokki 1998: 147). The Kanegafuchi spinning company was erected in
1887 with 29,000 spindles, and eventually became the leading company in 1903
with a total of 218,000 spindles (Koh 1966: 39). Overall, the Japanese cotton
spinning industry saw the creation of 54 firms between 1894 and 1899. Then the
number diminished through mergers, with only a few newcomers. Kuwahara
reports that “[a]t the end of 1898 thirteen companies had 50 percent of the
operating spindleage nationwide, and twenty-eight had 75 percent; however, byFlorence Molk 114
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the end of 1907 the number of enterprises in each category had fallen to five and
ten, respectively” (1998: 118). By 1907, six firms (“Big Six”),[27] with over
100,000 spindles each, possessed 61 percent of total Japanese spindleage, while
the top ten represented 76 percent (Kuwahara 1998: 118-120).[28] The Big Six
with a total of 911,939 spindles in contrast amounted to 0.7 percent of the
world’s spindleage capacity (Kuwahara 1998: 118; Farnie 2004: 23).
Table 3 Number of Firms in the Cotton Industry
UK US Continent Japan India[29]
1860 n/a n/a n/a
1880 1,874 56 n/a 5 62
1890 1,801 905 n/a 30 127[30]
1900 1,787 973 n/a 79 193
1910 1,977 1,324 n/a 36[31] 272
From Rose (2000: 162, table 6.2), Koh (1966: 325-326, 365, table 3-1, 367, table 3-3).
Profitability Profitability Profitability Profitability Profitability
Now that we have established to some extent the geographical expansion and
production characteristics of the cotton industry between 1760 and 1900, we can
attempt to demonstrate its profitability. But first, we will focus on calico
printing; although it is a sector often neglected, it is nonetheless important in
the eighteenth-century world-economy.
Calico printing
Calico printing played an important role in the cotton industry in particular,
and in the European economy of the second half of the eighteenth century
(Caspard 1979: 7).[32] This particular sector had been organized in factories even
before the rapid advent of cotton spinning (Chapman and Chassagne 1981: 3). The
industry was mostly located in France, Great Britain, Switzerland, and
Mulhouse. Based on miscellaneous sources, Chapman and Chassagne have
accounted for the number of firms[33] located in these countries and have
estimated the total production (million of meters) in 1785 to amount to 16.0 in
France (including Alsace), 12.4 in Great Britain[34], 3.2 in Neuch-âtel, and 3.0
in Mulhouse. Very early on, it was not unusual for workshops to employThe Journal of Philosophical Economics IV:1 (Special issue 2010) 115
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hundreds workers, and to possess a large amount of capital. For example, in the
1770’s, the most important French, British, and Swiss firms reached millions of
Livres or thousands Pounds. The industry also progressed because of chemical
and mechanical innovations, which improved production (Caspard 1979: 7;
Chapman and Chassagne 1981: 203, 10-13).
Among prominent calico printers a few names come to the fore; Robert Peel in
England, Christoff-Philipp Oberkampf in Jouy, Johann Heinrich von Schuele
in Augsburg, Joseph Leitenberg in Bohemia, and Dupasquier La
Fabrique-Neuve de Cortaillod (Neuchâtel).[35] We do possess detailed account of
La Fabrique-Neuve de Cortaillod and Oberkampf of Jouy, along with other
general information regarding the industry.[36] Based on these, we shall
attempt to estimate the degree of success of calico printing in the second half of
the eighteenth and early nineteenth century.
Profits and return on capital
An alternative in understanding the success of firms is to calculate the benefit
margins or the return on capital. Scant information for the period prior to the
1780’s does not permit a precise calculation. However, between 1750 and 1760,
the return on capital has been said to be exceptional for calico printing in
general. It continued to be lucrative until the early nineteenth century. In 1769,
Abram de Pury wrote that he could not believe the amount profitable returns he
made after contributing money to a calico-printing firm. In Basel, Ryhnier
affirmed that calico printing was at its best. Finally in Mulhouse, two years
earlier, Mathieu Mieg declared that calico printers made money while sleeping
(quoted in Caspard 1979: 164). In England, Thomas Phillips is recognized for
having made “huge profits” in the late eighteenth century (Howe 1984: 16). From
this assessment, it is undeniable that calico printing offered great potential
regarding profit making. However, the question is how did this translate into
numbers?
In 1766, Reyhnier, the luxury calico printer established in Basel, reported his
profit rate to be an average of 13.55 percent.[37] The same year, La
Fabrique-Neuve recorded a profit rate of 14.3 percent, but a return calculated as
return on sales (turnover: see endnote 39). Based on the Fabrique-Neuve’s
records, Caspard’s calculations of the profit rates[38] averaged between 21 and 18
percents in the decades spanning the 1750’s to 1790’s (Caspard 1979: 200, see tableFlorence Molk 116
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in annex VIII). For a period of twelve years following 1770, Schule’s returns on
capital averaged 30 per cent (Chapman and Chassagne 1981: 203). The average
returns on capital for the Fabrique-Neuve from the 1780’s to 1815 were more
than 30 percent, however the profit margin on turnover for the same period
amounted to about 17 percent (Caspard 1979: 165, 200). In comparison the
returns on capital at Oberkampf of Jouy, the averages from 1770 to 1815, were
about 14 percent and characterized by tremendous fluctuations over the years
(from 30 percent return in 1770 down to 9 percent in 1780’s up again to 35.5
percent in 1792 down to 12 percent in 1800 and finally a loss of -4.2 percent in
1813-14 (Chapman and Chassagne 1981: 137). The differences in percentage can
partly be explained depending on whether a firm worked on commission or
not.[39]
After the Napoleonic wars, business did not flourish as before. By the 1840’s,
most calico printers had difficulties in keeping with the increase competition in
the mass export market. For example, in England, several important calico
printers (Peel, Turner, and the brothers Hargreaves) sold their establishments,
turned to spinning and weaving, or abandoned the trade in the 1840’s (Howe
1984: 15). La Fabrique-Neuve reflects the general context, between 1818 and
1854 the firm was not as successful as in previous decades, left with important
stocks, lower margins, and losses. From 1838 to 1840, profits were still made;
however, afterwards it registered losses and eventually closed in 1854.
Cotton manufacture
Besides calico printing, technical innovations transformed cotton spinning
which eventually became dominant in the 1780’s. As already discussed, England
first monopolized production and eventually expanded geographically to the
Continent, the United States, India and Japan.
If, in general, the British cotton industry was mostly constituted of small to
medium size factories and only a few firms left adequate records, we can ask:
how successful were small factories compared to larger ones? Three scholars,
Lloyd-Jones, Le Roux, and Gatrell analyzed the viability of small, medium and
large firms between 1815 and 1841. They based their research on two
contemporary surveys, the Manchester Rate Books of 1815 and the Factory
Inspector’s survey of 1841. The three scholars came to slightly different
conclusions on the nature of the most vulnerable firms. Lloyd-Jones and LeThe Journal of Philosophical Economics IV:1 (Special issue 2010) 117
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Roux, focusing on the 1815 material, concluded that small firms were more
vulnerable, and those middle-sized ones were more successful overall. Gatrell, on
the other hand, focusing of the 1841 material concluded that the difference
between the two, small versus medium size, was not significant (Chapman 1979,
1987: 30; Gatrell 1977; Lloyd-Jones and Le Roux 1980). Both conclude, however,
that the cotton industry was not solely dominated by a selected number of large
factory owners.
Overall, while the pre-1815 period combined a number of large and small firms,
post-1815 witnessed a growing number of medium size firms, however, still
accompanied by small and large ones. While in 1815, 8 percent of firms
employed more than 500 workers, 9 percent did in 1841. Their share of the labor
force amounted respectively to 44 and 32 percent (Lloyd-Jones and Le Roux
1980: 74). But how successful were small to medium firms in comparison with
large ones? While it has been argued, “success was not the monopoly of giants”
(Crouzet 1982: 204; see also Gatrell 1977), Chapman, instead, cautions that in
times of financial strain, small factory owners who benefited from limited
connections and financial access were more vulnerable than large owners with
better networks (1987: 32-33).
Accordingly, because of a lack of adequate aggregate data, we shall attempt to
illustrate the general trends of the cotton industry in analyzing reports of
specific prominent firms for the period under study. A few British, American
and Japanese cotton manufactures left us precious records, which have been
unearthed from the archives by various scholars. First, we shall proceed in
uncovering information regarding the overall cost of production, then turn to
specific results of particular geographic locations to finally attempt establishing
the general profit rates of the cotton industry in the eighteenth and
nineteenth-century world-economy.
Costs of production
In the cotton industry, capital investment consisted of fixed and variable
capital.[40] Overall, during the early period, the cotton industry required a
relatively small amount of fixed capital in order to operate.[41] For instance,
after Cowpe, Oldknow & Co.’s creation, during the period 1790-1795 fixed capital
amounted to about half the total, however, the following three years it only
amounted to about one third (Chapman 1967: 125-126).[42] Early on, up toFlorence Molk 118
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1776-1785, the major source of capital came from retained profits. In Britain,
especially prior to the mid-nineteenth century, joint-stock companies hardly
existed. Firms’ owners or partners relied on personal savings and contributions
in order to raise their initial capital (Singleton 1997: 41). Small firms often
depended on family members or reliable local contacts in raising adequate assets.
Moreover, suppliers on many occasions allowed 4 to 8 months credit to their
customers, which was another way to accumulate enough capital (after
producing and selling cotton goods) to pay their bills (Chapman 1987: 33).
Even so the need for fixed capital rose over the years; in general, the cost of
cotton was in comparison much higher. Overall across time and space, the cost of
cotton despite a gradual decrease in prices still represented a large percentage of
the total cost of production. For example, in the United States, Almy and
Brown’s cost of raw cotton amounted to two-thirds of total expenditures in 1794
(Ware 1931: 124). In the 1830’s, the Ashworth’s New Eagerly mill in England
devoted 70 percent of its expenses to acquire raw cotton, 15 percent to pay wages,
and 15 percent reserved for capital and overheads (Boyson 1970: 48, footnote 2).
Circa 1840 based on Montgomery’s (1969) estimates, cost per yard in an
American mill consecrated 25.6 percent of its total cost for wages, 15.38 percent
on capital (including interest, insurance, depreciation and power), and 59
percent on cotton (including transport). Comparatively, a British mill devoted
23 percent to wages, 5.29 percent to capital and 71.7 percent to cotton (Jeremy
1990: 38). Law, in his study of Fieldens of Todmordern (GB), reported that:
Depending of the level of activity and cotton prices and margins, the annual turnover
of the spinning and weaving business in Todmordern in the 1850’s would lie between
£300,000/£450,000. In round figures the cotton bill would be around £150,000/
£250,000 and the direct wage bill between £60,000 and £80,000 per year. … [Then]
there were wage costs that were indirect overhead which in the fifties were of the
order of £13,000/14,000 per year; this included the wages of mechanics, masons and
other craftsmen, and ancillary staff (Law 1995: 111).
In Japan, early on the cost of raw cotton “represented 60-70 per cent of the cost
of spinning yarn” (Farnie and Abe 2000: 132). In the 1998 world-economy, the
cost of cotton still represented a large share of input costs. For example, in
Turkey (the fifth largest consumer of cotton), cotton yarn[43] amounted to an
average of 64 percent of the total costs of textile production. Labor costs were
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However in contrast, the prices of inputs or outputs have diminished over time.
T.S. Ashton constructed indices of annual average of British cotton prices (1829 = 100).
Over the years, the cost of cotton yarn continuously declined. In 1795 the index
was 252, decreased to 186 in 1815, further diminished to 118 in 1837, and finally
reached 94 in 1850 (Crouzet 1982: 196). The price of Sea Island raw cotton and
the price of yarn in England gradually declined from the 1790’s to the 1840’s. In
1799, the price of raw cotton per lb amounted to 25p to 26p; in 1834 it was only
7 ½ -12 ½ p (Lee 1972: 137, based on Ure 1970). While the price of raw cotton
might have been three to four times higher on the Continent than in England
during the Napoleonic wars, the gap was much reduced by 1910. The cost of
cotton, including transportation was $0.0015 per lb cheaper in New England
than in Lancashire. In contrast, the input cost in France and Germany were
only $0.0001 more per lb (Clark 1987: 144-145).
Although the wage ratio to the total cost of production varied slightly across
centers of production, wage rates differed according to locations. English wages
were rather stable in the first half of the nineteenth century, however decreasing
slightly in the 1920’s (Lee 1972: 141). On the continent, in the 1830’s, “hourly
wages compared with Manchester were about 37 percent in Mulhausen in the
Alsace, 28 percent in Zurich, 25 percent in some mills in the Vosges, 38 percent
in Ghent Belgium, 47 percent in Rouen, about 36 percent in Austria, and less
than 25 percent in Prussia” (Clark 1987: 142). Only in the United States and
Canada were wage rates higher than in Great Britain. By 1910, weekly wage
rates in England were 65 percent of that of the United States (New England and
the South combined). German and French rates were 76 and 74 percent of
British rates. More drastically, still based on England, Japanese and Indian
wage rates were 16 and 15.6 percent respectively. The lowest ones were Chinese
with 10.8 percent (Clark 1987: 146, based on the Special Agents Series of the U.S.
Bureau of Foreign and Domestic commerce and the U.S. Tariff Board report on
Cotton Manufactures and other sources of 1910). In 1998, hourly labor costs
were among the highest in Germany, Italy and the United States averaging
$21.48, $15.81 and $12.97 respectively. Compared to the United States, wage
rates in Turkey, China, India and Indonesia were 12.12 percent, 4.78 percent,
4.62 percent, and 1.85 percent correspondingly (Tan 2001: 38, based on Werner).
Not only are contemporary wage rates higher in Germany than in the United
States, the gap between the highest and lowest ones is deeper today than a
hundred years ago.Florence Molk 120
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Notwithstanding supplying most foreign markets, British cotton exports were
never taxed during the nineteenth century, and the import duty on raw
cotton[44] in existence since 1798 was eventually eliminated in 1845 (Farnie
1979: 5, 38). In France, despite an attempt at eliminating the extremely high
custom duty on raw cotton imposed since the Revolution, the act of 1816 further
enforced a duty ranging between 15 to 50 francs depending on the quality of
short or long staple cotton (Dunham 1928: 284-85). It was not until the 1860’s
that tariffs were relaxed. In the United States, in the early nineteenth century,
“tax exemptions” were allocated to cotton manufactures (Rose 2000: 46). In 1882,
the Japanese Spinner Association was created. In order to compete more fully in
the Asian export market (especially to China), the Spinner Association lobbied
to eliminate the export tax on cotton yarn; a request finally guaranteed in 1894.
The next move was of abolishing the cotton tariff, which eventually happened in
1896 (Fletcher 1998).
During the nineteenth century despite continued growth of the French cotton
industry, Britain still succeeded in producing more cheaply. Based on an 1829
survey, Houdoy evaluated the cost of production for two similar cotton spinning
firms in France and England, and found costs in the former to be higher than in
the latter. He argues that “[l’] Angleterre, produisant à très bas prix, avec un
outillage plus perfectionné que le notre, et des établissements qui lui coûtaient
mois cher, notre infériorité sur ce point était plus grande encore” (1903: 51-52).
However, based on the commercial inquiry of 1834, it had been established that
coarse cotton was spun more cheaply in Alsace than in England
(Shulze-Gaevernitz 1895: 37).
Before the Anglo-French Treaty of 1860, it was estimated that the yearly cost of
production per spindle in France was about 16 francs, and only 8 francs in
Britain. In the 1870’s, based on Legrand, Houdoy compared the cost of
production per spindle[45] in Britain and France. Based on 28 counts, the
total[46] in favor of Britain was 5 francs 67 (Houdoy 1903: 80, 301)
Profit levels
As mentioned earlier, successful firms often expanded through retained profits.
Various sources seem to agree that the greatest profit returns were made prior to
1815. According to Howe, the pre-1800 years were a period of “monopoly” profits,
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poor in particular years, as in 1793 and 1797, while accounting techniques were
weak (1984: 24). Several indications support the consensus that higher profits
were made during the war period than between 1815 and 1840; the proof being
that the “gap between price levels for cotton and yarn prices narrows strikingly
through the first half of the century” (Honeyman 1982: 58; Lee 1972:
140-141[47]). In addition, Schulze-Gaevernitz’s study estimates falling profits in
the English spinning industry from 1784 to 1832 in establishing the difference
between the price of 1 lb. of yarn, No. 40 twist and the price of the necessary
cotton for producing it. He concluded that the balance for expenses and profits
went from 8s.11d in 1784 to 0s.4d in 1832 (Schulze-Gaevernitz 1895: 35).[48] For
later periods based on Ellison, mill margins between 1859 and 1860 amounted to
“8d per pound cloth,” and its average diminished to 5.5d between 1865 and 1870.
In the 1870’s mill margins regained ground and reached 7d per pound, but
further fell again by 1872 to 4.5d per pound and eventually diminished even
further in following years (Ellison, quoted in Law 1995: 130).
Nevertheless, many scholars refer to the famous Kinkman Finlay’s testimony (on
the behalf of the cotton manufactures) to the Select Committee of the Commons
in 1833 declaring that profits by then were small because of deepening
competition.[49] He added “I think its character is one of great expansion, of
rapid scale and activity, but making very moderate profits” (quoted in Barr 2000:
141). Still according to Finlay, higher profits, especially in spinning, were
recorded earlier, when “competition was less intense and prices were much
higher” (Honeyman 1982: 58). He was also quoted saying “the best time that I
ever knew in the spinning trade was about 1802; it was, however, even better
before that” (quoted in Lee 1972: 139). Crouzet, referring to the cotton
manufacture as well as other industries, pointed out that return on capital often
reached up to 20 per cent during good years, especially prior to 1815.[50]
Cottrell, on the other hand, noticed a decrease in profit rates during the second
quarter of the nineteenth century (1980: 24).
Again, how did these testimonies translate into numbers? Prior to the 1800, in
spite of an acknowledged recognition of high profit making, only a few records
are fully accessible. For example, under the Arkwright‘s patent, “the Robinsons
of Nottingham … were earning 100 percent on their investment in mills and
plant in 1784” (Chapman 1987: 31). But for the twenty year period 1778-1798,
the average return on capital (average £46,787) for Cradwell and Birley was 13.1
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detailed records, and one of them consists of M’Connel and Kennedy’s partnership
which was established in 1795 with an initial capital of £ 1,632.12.1. Before
deciding to specialize in cotton spinning, the partners were involved in the
machine making business, a sector they eventually abandoned in the early 1800’s.
Adam and George Murray, who also specialized in fine cotton spinning, were
M’Connel and Kennedy’s biggest competitor, and the two, according to Lee,
controlled “the fine yard market during the war.” In 1811, the valuation of their
respective firms amounted to £ 20,455.16.0 for Murray and £18,152.14.0 for
M’Connel & Kennedy (Lee 1972: 27).
M’Connel & Kennedy was essentially geared to the European export market,
which experienced trial and tribulation during the Napoleonic Wars. In this
instance, the firm reflected the state of the British export market which began
to expand in the 1790’s, and by 1805, two-thirds of the total output was sold
abroad because of an adequate demand and a general lack of competition from
Europe. During the Napoleonic Wars (and the continental blockade), export was
a difficult undertaking, but the firms who succeeded in selling products abroad
did get excellent returns (Lee 1972: 52). At the end of hostilities in 1815, the
market in general and export to Europe in particular, was no longer as
lucrative, with prices at times reduced to half what they had once been. Overall,
the partnership faced slowdowns between 1808-1809 during the Continental
Blockade, and during the American Embargo of 1807-1809/1814. In general, the
industry experienced successive trade slumps during 1808-1810, 1814, 1815-16,
1819 and 1825-26 (Lee 1972: 36). Similarly, in Alsace, the firm Méquillet et cie
also experienced an economic downturn in 1810-11, and again in 1814—a crisis
that affected the Empire in general (Fohlen 1956: 20-25).
Fluctuating results from one year to another were not uncommon overall. For
example, the Pleasley cotton mill of Cowpe, Oldknow & Co averaged return on
capital amounting to 36% between 1790 and 1792, but recorded a loss the following
year, perhaps somewhat explained as the result of war with France. Then the
1794-1797 average reached 16.44 percent (1795 missing) (Pigott 1949: 37).
Over the course of 12 years (1798 to 1809) despite drasticly different annual
results, the two firms of M’Connel & Kennedy and Pleasey mill of Cowpe,
Oldknow, Siddon & Co averaged 18.9 percent return on capital.[51] The period
1799-1802/1804 was the most fruitful for M’Connel & Kennedy with three years
of returns of more than 30 percent (Lee 1972: 167, table 13; Pigott 1949: 37-38).
N. Dugdale, with a much smaller average capital, managed a 24.8 percent returnThe Journal of Philosophical Economics IV:1 (Special issue 2010) 123
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between 1797 and 1802 (Howe 1984: 27). As for Cowpe, Odknow and Siddon & Co,
the average return between 1797 and 1803 was 28 percent (Pigott, 1949: 37-38).
Therefore, the average of the three firms amounted to 26.34 percent between 1797
and 1802. However, for M’Connel and Cowpe, Oldknow the average returns
dropped drastically to only 5.2 and 8.6 percent respectively between 1805 and
1809.
How did these results compare to the nascent industry on the continent? Some
information relating to the cost of cloth production (not spinning) in northern
France (département du Nord)[52] indicates the growing importance of the
cotton industry with the return on sales amounting to 4.3 percent in 1789 and 10
percent in 1801 (Houday 1903: 30).[53]
For the period following the Napoleonic Wars up to the 1880s, a few surviving
records of firms exist.[54] For the industry in general, after mediocre results
following the end of hostilities, profit margins had increased between 1818 and
1825, and had decreased between 1826 and 1830. Despite uneven results among
firms, the average returns did not exceed 10 percent for the period spanning the
late 1810s and the 1820’s. The firm Thomson, Chippindall averaged from 1812 to
1826 a return on capital of 7.8 percent (Howe 1984: 27). If we compare results
between the Gregs and the Ashworths,[55] the former reflects the industry’s trend
more than the latter. Overall, if we compare the degree of success of the two
firms over a period of twelve years (1819-1830) the Gregs’ return on capital of
13.6 per cent was more than twice as much as the Ashworths’ 5.2 percent. In
combining the two we obtain an average of 9.18 percent (Rose 1986: 53; Boyson
1970:18). For a shorter time period, Thornber made 7.8 percent average return on
capital from 1821 to 1825 (Howe 1984: 27), the Gregs returns were 17.6 percent
and the Ashworths 4.9 per cent, thus totaling an average of 10.1 percent for the
three firms.
In this context, how did the Alsatian firm Méquillet-Noblot perform during this
period? Overall, results were rather positive from 1818 to 1826, but not as good
from 1827 to 1832 with no registered profits at times, thus reflecting the general
situation in Britain (see Fohlen 1956: 135, annexe 15—profits et pertes). Based
on the firm’s balance sheet of 1817, the return on capital (invested by three
partners) was 4.3 percent (Fohlen 1956: 133).[56]
The 1830’s and 1840’s were generally marked with recession and bad trading
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with losses in 1833-34 and again in 1837 and 1840 (Rose 1986: 62). The
following downturn years 1837-39 imposed a loss of more than £33,000 for
M’Connel and Kennedy reflecting the Gregs’ experience, as well as the a general
economic depression that affected some firms more severely than others (Lee
1972: 140; Howe 1984: 25). The same fate awaited the Ashworths at New Eagerly
with negative returns from 1839 to 1842 (Boyson 1970: 30). However, for short
3-4 year periods, some firms succeeded to average returns of 10-11 percent.[57]
Overall, however, returns were in the low single digits. The Peels and Hollins,
Siddon & Co (previously known as Cowpe, Oldknow …) barely enjoyed a positive
return of 2.1 percent and 1.2 percent from 1831 to 1834 (Howe 1984: 27; Pigott
1949: 72). The average return on capital of New Eagly (Ashworth) amounted to
3.78 percent for the period of 1832-1841, characterize by yearly uneven results.
The mill at Egerton averaged a return of 2.3 percent with similar fluctuations
and losses on capital employed between 1838 and 1840 (Boyson 1970: 30).[58] On
the whole, a drastic “decline in profits … in the 1840’s” was recorded (Farnie
1979: 202). In the early forties, Hollins and Co. lost money as well. The Fieldens
after having performed well in the previous decade registered very low or
negative returns (Law 1995: 66). The early forties were quite dismal for both the
Fieldens and Ashworths (New Eagley) with 1.84 percent and 0.6 percent average
annual returns on capital from 1841 to 1845. In general, the 1830’s and 1840’s
were characteristic of great fluctuations and inconsistent returns. Despite the
unequal results, the average returns were very modest.
The financial results of Méquillet-Noblot during the 1830’s up to the mid-fifties
did not replicate previous success. Results were simply average or even negative,
especially during the 1840’s (Fohlen 1956: 59, 135-136).
In the early 1850’s the state of the cotton industry recovered overall and
continued to offer positive returns in general up to the 1870’s, but still with
various fluctuations and temporary recession. According to Farnie “a plateau of
relatively gradual decline” characterized the British cotton industry from 1845
to 1885 (Farnie 1979: 202).[59] For example, Law already compared the results
of Henry Ashworth and the Fielden Brothers in reporting that “the results at
Ashworth’s New Eagley Factory, also a combined spinning and weaving
enterprise, if on the fine cotton side, show for the years 1854 to 1861 and average
capital employed of £70,298, and an average profit of £7,174 after paying
interest of 5 percent on the capital. These results represent an average return on
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much the same period of 24 percent on a much larger capital” (Law 1995:
114).[60] For the early 1860’s, Law and Boyson, based on Watts, estimated the
average profit of the industry between 1862 and 1865 (during the cotton famine)
to average 12.5 percent (Boyson 1970: 69; Law 1995: 118). The average for both
Fieldens and Ashworth were 19 and 14 percent respectively, therefore slightly
higher than the industry’s average (Law 1995: 118).[61] Based on Ashworth’s
yearly return on capital, we can establish averages for different periods up to
1880: 1855-1864: 10 percent, 1865-1874: 8.6 percent, or 1865-1879: 7.9 percent
(Boyson 1970: 66, see page 68, table 14 for detailed returns).
Boyson notices that in the 1860’s and 1870’s surplus capital was generally not
reinvested in the firm, but was instead given out as shares; thus reflecting a
common practice of the cotton firms at the time when plague with a “low rate of
reinvestment” (Boyson 1970: 67). He resumes the situation of the firms between
1854 and 1879 in the following terms:
New Eagley’s profits on the capital employed from 1854 to 1879 averaged 8.1 percent
in addition to the continued payment of interest on all loan and partners’ capital. To
arrive, therefore at figures of the true profit the interest paid on the capital in excess
of the capital employed should be added. This averaged 0.6 percent on the capital
employed throughout the period and thus the industrial return on capital employed at
New Eagley from 1854 to 1879 was 8.1 percent plus 5 percent interest and 0.6 percent,
a total of 13.7 percent (Boyson 1970: 67).
The “Ashworths’ profits from 1875 to 1878 are remarkable since there was reduced
output and partial depression in the Lancashire cotton industry.” Boyson also
points out the growing competition from France after 1872 as a possible factor of
increasing difficulties encountered (Boyson 1970: 69). For the Fielden Brothers at
Todmorden (combining weaving and spinning) the period following the American
Civil war was marred with poor returns or losses, the situation even worsened in
the mid 1870’s. Law notices that between 1866 and 1889, the firm experienced
negative returns (losses) “thirteen out of the twenty four years” (Law 1995: 128,
and based on table XVIII, 129). As for the hosiery firm of W. Hollins and Co. the
results were surprisingly high with 26 percent returns on paid up nominal capital
in 1873, 24 percent the following year, and then decreasing to 18 in 1875-76 to
reach 9 percent in 1881 (Pigott 1949: 86). The firm’s average returns from 1873 and
1881 were 15.4 percent, higher than the average returns for the industry as a
whole. In the latter part of the century, both French and German (Saxony whoFlorence Molk 126
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was already a serious competitor in the 1830’s) hosiery industries were still
competing with the English (Pigott 1949: 83).
Regardless, the overall situation of the cotton industry in Britain was
characterized with a number of failed businesses. Farnie reports “[t]he number of
formal bankruptcies averaged only 31.6 per annum between 1873 and 1896, with
one marked peak of 66 per annum in 1877-9, and thus declined to one-third of
the average annual rate of 101 during the deep post-Famine depression of
1865-69” (1979: 204). In the last quarter of the nineteenth century, mill
margins[62] continued to decrease even further, indicating a loss of competitive
advantage overall (1979: 203).
Besides the British and continental cotton industry, the American cotton trade
expanded fairly quickly in the 1820’s supplying a growing internal market.
Before looking for general trends, let us first analyze the state of the American
industry and then evaluate the results in consort with those from Britain.
Before 1807, the American cotton industry had been prosperous in general, but
on a small scale; however, after the embargo cotton manufacturing began
expanding, since the market relied less heavily on British textiles and
protectionist measures were introduced (Rose 2000: 46). Although the post-war
years 1818 and 1819 were particularly bad ones, business, nonetheless, picked up
in the 1820’s. Between 1817 and 1821, dividends in Waltham averaged 19¼
percent a year, and in 1822, dividends increased to 27½ percent. Dividends in the
Lowell companies in 1830 were 8, 6 and 11 percent and increased to 18, 18½ and
24 per cent respectively in 1831 (Ware 1931: 140-41, 143).
Despite the fact that it is difficult to estimate the rate of profit of the cotton
industry for the whole period, Ware offers us rough estimates.
From 1827 to 1846 the average dividend from the large companies was 9 per cent.
This was during the most prosperous period of the industry and from the most
successful mills. If we averaged with these the dividends of the small mills,
including those which failed in 1829 and 1837 while the larger ones carried safely
on, the percentage might be considerably lowered. Moreover, except for the Waltham
company whose early large dividend were due to the power loom and the machine
shop, the rates from 1816 to 1827 were lower than in the later period. An average
including all mills and the whole period from 1816 to 1846 might very probably show
little over three per cent as the return on capital invested in the business (Ware
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Beginning in the 1830’s, we can base our analysis on the Baker samples.[63] The
sample offers a fairly complete report up to the late 1880’s, with reports on
profits as percent of sales, profits as percent of net worth, and percentage return
to capital. Overall, the trend of profits as percent of sales from 1836 to 1886
tends to decline. For example, the average profit from 1836 to 1839 was 13.25
percent, it increased however to 15.23 percent from 1840 to 1849, declined to 8.7
percent between 1850 and 1859, increased to 9.4 percent from 1860 to 1869
(however results for 1862-1865 are missing), decreased again to 5.95 percent in
1870-1879, and finally reached 6.5 percent from 1880 to 1886 (McGoudrick 1968:
99, see table 13 for detailed yearly returns). McGoudrick also examined profits
as percent of net worth and sales.[64] Although percentages are following
similar trends, they tend to differ somewhat. He explains the discrepancy
between profit to sale and profit to net worth:
[t]his divergence between the profit/sales and profit/equity capital trends was caused
by a large secular decline in requirements for equity capital per unit of output …
[M]ost of this decline resulted from a fall in fixed and working capital per dollar of
sales. Debt rose only moderately relative to total assets. Thus, the capital/output ratio
was declining, and this permitted a steady fall in the profit share of output without
any noticeable long-term decline in the profit to equity rate (McGoulick 1968:
100).[65]
The results on returns to capital are based on three firms of the Baker samples:
Merrimack, Boston and Hamilton for the period 1837-1861, and two firms
Naumkeag and Pepperell for the period 1853-1861 and 1872-1880. The average
return from 1837 to 1839 amounted to 9.8 percent, increased to 10.5 percent from
1840 to 1849, and decreased to 9.2 percent for 1850-1859. The second batch
(Naumkeag and Pepperell) averaged 9.8 percent between 1853 and 1861, no result
in the following decade, and decreased to 8.79 percent from 1872 to 1879
(McGoulick 1968: 108-109).
Conclusions Conclusions Conclusions Conclusions Conclusions
Are there any comparisons we can establish regarding the British and American
cotton industries? During the Whaltham period in the early 1820’s, dividends
were fairly high for a couple of years, with a percentage close to or higher than
20 percent. In Britain, the average returns on capital seemed to have balanced
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and 1840’s seemed to have been faced with bigger fluctuations and negative
returns, although apparently small U.S. firms had times of struggle. Certainly
results are scattered and fluctuated between losses and fairly decent positive
returns, but the average returns most probably were lower than 6 percent. In the
U.S. the average seemed to have been around 10 percent. As mentioned
previously, the British cotton industry regained potential in the 1850’s and
1860’s. The small sample of British firms compared to the U.S. ones, seems to
indicate that percentage returns were closer, averaging between 8 and 10 percent.
After the 1870’s the British cotton industry experienced mixed results, while
some firms managed to register positive results, the industry in general did not
fair very well. Overall, despite the growing importance of the American cotton
industry in the world-economy, it seems that in spite of better returns than in
Britain, especially in the period of the 1830’s through the 1840’s, the heydays of
cotton in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century were never to be
recaptured, suggesting the decline of what had been the leading industry of the
capitalist world-economy as new industries others emerged with high rates of
profit to assure global accumulation.
Finally, in the latter part of the nineteenth century the cotton industry
expanded as far as Japan. Some information is available regarding the early
years. One of the most prominent firms, “the Osaka Spinning Mill distributed
dividends based on … profit percentage,” which amounted to an average of 11.6
per cent from 1883 to 1885 and increased to 27.6 per cent between 1887 and 1889
(Koh 1966: 38). Although the results are those of a single firm, the percentages
are quite high, especially those of the last three years. We can even compare
those with the most prosperous years of the British cotton industry in the late
eighteenth century. Other results are available to us for the early twentieth
century. Kuwahara reported the returns on paid-up capital for the so-called “Big
nine firms” in 1906-1908.[66] The results are tremendous in recording average
returns of 72.23 percent for 1906, 59.53 percent the following year, and finally a
lower return of 25.7 percent in 1908 (1998: 125, based on table 9). If we contrast
those results with those of seven “small to medium firms,” although we obtain
smaller returns on paid-up capital of 52.85, 57.47 and 7.8 percent respectively,
the first two years record remarkable returns while we notice a considerable
decrease in 1908 (1998: 125). Generally, the returns on paid-up capital are very
high, even more so for the largest firms. In 1908 a relative slump was suffered,
but the average return for the largest companies still averaged 20 percent.
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the principal cotton-yarn markets at home … fluctuations in either domestic or
foreign markets had relatively little impact on them” (1998: 128-130). However,
the small-to-medium firms had more difficulties in competing and some even
suffered from negative returns (1998: 130).
Other information regarding dividends based on percentage of paid-in capital for
Japanese domestic spinning companies show an average of 14.41 percent from
1903 to 1910 (Duus 1998: 36, based on table 3.2) and rose to more than 50 percent
in 1918-1920.
What can we infer from these observations? How does the Japanese cotton
industry fair in comparison to England, the continent and the United States?
From the above samples it seems that the return on capital of the Japanese
spinning industry was extremely high. However, the samples cover only three
years. Comparatively, the dividends of the British cotton spinning industry from
1906 to 1908 averaged 9.66 percent, 15.8 percent and 11.75 percent respectively
(higher averages than previous and following years). After the First World War,
dividends also reached much higher averages than the norm, from 16.2 percent in
1818 to 21.25 percent the following year and finally 40.21 percent in 1920.
Nonetheless, in 1921 the percentage had decreased to 9.9 (see Sandberg 1974: 105,
table 15 for detailed returns from 1884 to 1925). So the sample from Japan might
be reflecting a global peak for a very limited number of years. And we should
also understand that the results represent only a small portion of worldwide
averages.
In sum, the cotton industry first established its supremacy in Britain in the
second half of the eighteenth century and recorded its highest returns prior to
1815. While manufacturing spread to the continent under protectionist
measures, the industry’s results never surpassed those of Britain during its best
period. By the time the industry spread to the United States in the early
nineteenth century, pioneer firms recorded high returns, but overall, while the
American industry faired slightly better than the British, especially in the
1830’s and 1840’s, its results never consistently rivaled those from the heyday of
cotton in Britain. Once Japan entered the fray in the late nineteenth century,
its monopolistic spinning firms seemed to have rivaled or even surpassed other
world manufacturers. Although Japan benefited from the highest returns in the
early twentieth century, during the same period returns were relatively high in
Britain as well for a limited numbers of years just preceding and following the
First World War. But King Cotton that first ruled in Britain in the lateFlorence Molk 130
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eighteenth and early nineteenth century and despite many emulators over time
and space, would never recapture the grandeur of its yesteryears.
Endnotes Endnotes Endnotes Endnotes Endnotes
[1] Among divers innovations, the Hargreaves spinning jenny was created in
1764, later improved by Arkwright, and finally further improved by the
Crompton mule in 1779 (see Pigot 1949: 17-18; Deane and Cole 1967: 183).
[2] For example, the recorded number of power looms and handlooms in 1835
were 109,000 and 188,000 respectively. Ten years later (1845), the numbers were
225,000 and 60,000 respectively (Crouzet 1982: 199). Likewise, the period
between 1830 and 1860 recorded the largest number of firms that combined
spinning and weaving (vertical integration). Most produced coarse spinning and
plain weaving. However, by the 1850’s, specialization began to take precedence in
locating spinning in south Lancashire and weaving in north Lancashire by the
1880’s (see Farnie 1979).
[3] Crouzet reports that already in 1814/15, “[c]otton industries furnished 40 per
cent of the total value of the country’s export.” A peak of 51 percent was achieved
in 1830 (Crouzet 1982: 194).
[4] “The continents of Europe and America,” says Ure in 1836, “possessed up to
some time ago, after the peace of 1814, only factories in such small degree that
they could by no means be viewed as competitors in the world’s markets. To-day,
however, they manipulate 750,000 bales of cotton, which is about three-fourths
of our consumption, and they have become dangerous competitors in many
markets which up to now belonged entirely to us” (Quoted in Schulze-Gaevernitz
1895: 37).
[5] Napoleonic Wars: referring to the period between 1792 and 1815.
[6] Calico printing originated in India, which supplied European markets until
increased competition and protectionist measures diminished its potential.
[7] However, despite the continental blockade and the sea blockade (imposed by
the British), trade in general still flourished either through smuggling or with
the help of legal maneuvers. Furthermore, the spread of the cotton industry on
the continent, in the U.S., and later on in Japan and India depended onThe Journal of Philosophical Economics IV:1 (Special issue 2010) 131
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technological know-how first developed by the British. Therefore, all nascent
industries depended on machinery of British origin, and often obtained illegally
(their export was officially banned until 1843). Early on skilled operatives were
also forbidden to migrate. Schulze-Gaevernitz emphasizes the importance of
smuggling, “It is certainly known that tremendous quantities of English yarns
went to the Continent during and after the Continental blockades. Whole
industries have to attribute their present situation to smuggling”
(Shulze-Gaevernitz 1895: 37).
[8] Based on John Komlos, Good reports that “after zero growth in the 1780’s,
value added in the cotton industry grew annually at 2.7 percent in the 1790’s and
at 4.9 percent in the first two decades of the nineteenth century.” The textile
industry was mostly concentrated in Lower Austria and Bohemia, where by the
1840’s machine spinning had become prominent. For example, Lower Austria
produced 48 percent of the total production of cotton spinning in 1841, while
Bohemia produced 30.9 percent. The Tyrol and Vorarlberg whose industry was
linked to Switzerland constituted the third region (Good 1984: 37, 50).
[9] The discrepancy had subsided by 1910, since the cost of cotton was more or
less equal in Britain and on the Continent (France, Germany), or even in Asia.
According to Clark “only for Mexico and Switzerland did transportation
significantly raise cotton costs” (Clark 1987: 145).
[10] The English cotton industry also suffered a downturn after the Napoleonic
Wars.
[11] Coarse Indian cotton products continued to enter the American market up
to the implementation of the tariff of 1818 (see Ware 1931).
[12] Rose calculated the spindleage percentage located in the South which
amounted to 5.21 percent in 1860, 4.12 percent in 1870, 4.71 percent in 1880, 9.64
percent in 1890, 20.76 percent in 1900 and 34.80 percent in 1910 (2000: 180).
[13] The Meiji government tried to promote the creation of spinning mills under
its watch, but not very successfully. In general, private firms became the motor
of the Japanese cotton industry.
[14] Chokki notes that until 1922 ring spinning machines were imported from
England (1998: 6). See also Farnie and Nakaoka (2000: 9-27) for a brief
discussion on the Meiji reforms and the Japanese economic development.Florence Molk 132
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[15] Koh asserts that in 1887 50.8 percent and 49.2 percent of yarn imports came
from Britain and India, respectively. In 1898 India’s share was 0.7 percent and
England 99.3 percent (1966: 24).
[16] A previous company by the name of Fort Gloster had been erected in 1818.
However, it showed poor results (profits) and did not encourage the creation of
other mills. It remained an isolated experiment (Koh 1966: 90).
[17] Timmins, in the case of Lancashire, cautions us about the reliability of
such data since “[a] considerable increase occurred in the manufacture of fine
cotton yarns and cloths, including muslins, which compared with coarser
textiles, required smaller amounts of raw material per unit of output.
Additionally, less raw cotton was wasted as packing and spinning techniques
improved. For both these reasons, a more rapid growth in the volume of output
would have occurred than the raw cotton figures suggest.” He also argues that
the “figures also give a false impression of the rise of value of the cotton
industry’s output, since finer cotton products were more expensive than coarse
cotton and fustians” (1998: 87-88). However, the goal of our exercise here is to
establish the relative importance of cotton industry over time and of its
dissemination over space. See Deane and Cole (1967: 184-187) for a discussion
and table of estimates of cotton-industry output, 1760-1816 in Britain and for
the development of cotton manufacture of the United Kingdom 1819-1917 (based
on Ellison 1968).
[18] However, calico printing dominated the cotton industry in the 1760’s and
1780’s. The real growth of cotton spinning began in the last quarter of the
eighteenth century.
[19] Cotton consumption estimates have been reported in slightly different
amounts by other authors.
[20] Prior to 1860 there is no data for U.S. cotton consumption.
[21] Figures for 1909
[22] For 1860, the total was 184
[23] The results here are essentially based upon Farnie’s computation. When
referring to other sources, the numbers vary slightly since no formal world
statistics existed prior to 1908. In this case, the American category includes theThe Journal of Philosophical Economics IV:1 (Special issue 2010) 133
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U.S., Canada, Mexico and Brazil from 1870. Prior to it only the U.S. was
computed. For Asia, India and Japan are computed for 1870-1880, joined by
China for the next decades (Farnie 2004: 23-24, see table 2.1).
[24] The figure refers to number of mills, and not firms.
[25] In Britain alone the percentage was 5.8%, based on the 1810 estimates. The
calculations are based upon the estimates reported by Farnie (see Farnie 2004:
23, table 2.1).
[26] It should be noted that the number of spindles for individual firms is not
consistently reported every year. Therefore, the total might be less.
[27] The firms are: Kanegafuchi Boseki Kaisha (Kanegafuchi Cotton Spinning
Co.), Mie Boseki Kaisha, Fuji Gasu Boseki Kaisha, Settsu Boseki Kaisha,
Osaka Cotton Spinning Co., and Osaka Godo Boseki Kaisha.
[28] As seen in Table 3, the Japanese cotton industry contrasts with the British,
Continental (Germany, France, Austro/Hungary), and U.S. industry in having a
much higher concentration of firms. Farnie and Abe also indicate that “[t]he five
leading firms raised their share of the total mule-equivalent spindleage from
23.5 per cent in 1898 to 58 per cent in 1913 (2000: 123).
[29] The figure is for the years 1889/1890 to 1893/1894.
[30] The number of firms has diminished; however, the number of mills has
augmented
[31] In the United States in 1890, 62 percent of production was done with ring
spindles and eventually reached 87 percent by 1913. On the other hand, Britain
employed only 19 percent of ring spindles for its production in 1913 (Lazonick
1986: 19).
[32] The ban on calico printing had been lifted in France in 1759 and in
England in 1774. Nevertheless, the ban on production had been more successful
than the selling prohibition which had been bypassed through smuggling to both
countries.
[33] Between 1760/62 and 1785, the number of French firms rose from about 42
to 115. During the same period, the number of English firms went from 28 to
111. Finally, in Neuchâtel the number went from 9 to 10 and in Mulhouse, fromFlorence Molk 134
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15 to 21. The industry also spread to other locations; by the 1790’s,
manufacturing units are found in Bohemia-Moravia, Hamburg, Saxony
(Chapman and Chassagne 1981: 8, 11).
[34] See Fitton and Wadsworth (1968: 74-75) for the increase in calico yardage
in Britain between 1775 and 1783.
[35] Prominent calico printers were also found among merchants who often
invested some of their capital in the industry, therefore making it difficult to
adequately assess their revenues pertaining solely to the industry (Chapman and
Chassagne 1981: 185).
[36] La Fabrique-Neuve was located in Neuchâtel, Switzerland. At the date of its
creation in 1752, Neuchâtel was under Prussian control. The firm was of
importance in Europe, and served as a model for Oberkamf. In fact, La
Fabrique-Neuve dominated calico printing during that period, and its French
and Alsatian counterparts desperately wanted to hire its workers, or Swiss calico
printer in general (Caspard 1979: 159). The firm specialized in the export market
for luxury items, and was financially successful until 1818, less so afterwards
and finally closed in 1854. At the end of the eighteenth century, its total
production equaled 4 percent of the Swiss production, 3.5 percent of the French
and 2 percent of the English, while in the 1840’s it decreased to 4 percent, 1.2
percent and 0.3 percent, respectively (Caspard 1979: 127). In England, the Peels
were prominent calico printers who later became involved in spinning and
weaving. Unfortunately, no firm records are available for the Peels. The
Lancashire firm of Livesey Hargreaves & Co was said to employ “between 700 and
1000 printers during the 1780’s. However in 1788, when production of cotton
goods for a time overtook consumption and credit was too freely extended, the
firm was forced into bankruptcy with debts reputedly amounting to a massive
£1.5 million” (Timmins 1998: 97). Regardless, the printing trade continued to
expand.
[37] He reported results four different types of products: ordinary calico, 11.2
percent; handkerchiefs no. 50, 9.8 percent; fine cloth no. 50, 13.3 percent; and
other (Peruvian) 19.9 percent. He based his calculation in establishing the
percentage return on cost price, calculated as follows: Profit x 100/cost price.
Could we assume that the return on sales would consist of adding profits to the
price cost, and then the percentage return on sales would be slightly less
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[38] Caspard’s calculation of profit rate (profit margin) in this instance equals
gross profit x 100 and divided by the annual turnover. The author also points out
that producers of luxury items tended to register greater profit margins during
downturns. One of the reasons being the cost of dye was higher during periods of
increased demand for the product. Caspard noticed that “[A]insi, le boom de la
production, entre 1754 et 1766, la [marge de bénéfice] vit passer de 22.5 à 14.3%
du chiffre d’affaires, tandis que de 1767 à 1775, en pleine période de marasme,
elle remontait à 22.7%. De même, les années 1792-1797 virent la production
bondir de 27.293 à 44.290 pièces, tandis que la marge chutait de 26.5 à 16.9%”
(Caspard 1979: 157-58).
[39] Chapman notes that “recurrent commercial crises could threaten the
solvency of even the most stable business … as Oberkampf found following a
collapse in profits in the years 1793-1796. It was perhaps because of the
omnipresent threat of a run on working capital that our English and French
entrepreneurs retained wealthy partners for most of their business careers, while
Dupasquier (Fabrique-Neuve) worked on commission for merchants houses to
which he was closely tied” (Chapman and Chassagne 1981: 203). Caspard comes to
the same conclusion. Overall, industrial profits seemed to have been more even
over time than commercial ones. Between 1783 and 1795, industrial profits never
went below 16 percent, but commercial ones (Pourtalès) recorded negative
results in 1789, 1791 and 1793 (Caspard 1979: 168). During 1792-1798, La
Fabrique benefited from a 50 percent return, Pourtalès, on the other hand,
recorded only a 6 percent return in 1790-1795. Furthermore, it seems that calico
printers who worked through an agent benefited from greater returns than those
who combined both printing and selling. Caspard compared the results of
Oberkampf (which combined the two activities) and la Fabrique-Neuve (which
worked through an agent) and concluded that while both firms possessed similar
outputs, their results differed. For example, during the period 1783-1792,
Oberkampf had a return of 9 percent while la Fabrique-Neuve’s amounted to 38
percent (1979: 168). Therefore, Caspard points out that depending on the modes
of investments, profits and profit rates did not necessarily coincide. Back in
1766, Ryhnier calculated that two firms producing similar output would not
enjoy the same profit rates depending on their modes of distribution. Caspard
summarizes the example: “Selon son hypothèse, chaque fabrique comprend 45
tables d’impression, et travaille 36 semaines par an. Pendant ce laps de temps elle
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tout. Pour imprimer ces toiles, l’entreprise A, qui travaille pour son compte, doit
immobiliser en toiles blanches, frais de fabrication et stocks 272,511 florins qui
lui rapportent 18,873 florins, soit 6.9% de profit. L’entreprise B, qui travaille à
façon, ne doit immobiliser que 23,433 florins en frais de fabrication rapportant
un profit annuel de 10,910 florins, soit 46.5%” (Caspard 1979: 168).
[40] Fixed capital: buildings, machinery; working capital: funds to purchase
inputs (cotton), pay wages, hold stocks; “in the interval between the beginning of
each round of production and the final receipt of payments from customers (see
Singleton 1997: 40).
[41] In contrast, in calico printing working capital was even more important.
Howe reports that “[f]or calico printing as a whole in 1834, the ratio of working
capital to fixed capital was 6.4:5.4 compared with 7.4:14.8 in manufacturing
(1984: 16, quoted in footnote 59).
[42] Based on several insurance records, Chapman argues that Oldknow, Cowpe &
Co. were fairly representative of other contemporary (hosiery) firms’ valuation
(see 1967: 125- 135).
[43] Note the reference is made to cotton yarn and not raw cotton.
[44] In 1815 the duty amounted to “2d per lb on British ships and 3d per lb on
foreign” (Lloyd-Jones and Lewis 1988: 70).
[45] The average annual cost per spindle is obtained by adding together the cost
of labor, energy, interest-depreciation, and other general costs (transports,
maintenance, insurances …) (Houdoy 1903: 298).
[46] The detailed difference was as follows: interests and depreciation, 2 francs
50; lighting, 0.10 francs; energy, 0.76 francs; labor, 1 franc; and overall costs, 1
franc 40 (Houdoy 1903: 301).
[47] Lee attributes the decline in profits after the Napoleonic Wars more to “the
decline in price margin between cotton and yarn throughout this period … wages
were fairly steady, falling only a little from the middle of the 1820’s” (Lee 1972:
141).
[48] The balance in 1797 was 4s.2d., 1s. in 1812, .0s.7d in 1822
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[49] Lee quotes Finlay’s remarks: “I attribute the low state of profit not to any
sort of demand, if we compare the demand now with the demand at any former
period, but to an extremely extensive production with reference to the demand,
arising out of a great competition, doubtless caused by the high rate of profit in
former times, which, by attracting a large amount of capital to the business, has
necessarily led to the low rate of profit we now see” (Lee 1972: 139).
[50] Crouzet’s estimation included not only the cotton industry, but others as
well, thus inferring that high returns were not exclusive to cotton. He further
notes “even in poor years profits were respectable, especially when one remembers
that the partners of a firm first assured themselves of a fixed interest (generally
5 percent) on their capital, and only the earnings over and above this were
considered as ‘profits’; they were, in fact, net profits, and statistics dealing only
with such figures tend to minimize the return on capital” (Crouzet 1972: 196).
[51] Howe based on Lee, reports slightly different figures for the same period
with an average return on capital of 16 percent for M’Connel & Kennedy (1984:
27).
[52] However, despite its relevance, the department du Nord was not as
important as Alsace then.
[53] The production of cloth increased from 1,275 pieces in 1789 to 88, 850 in
1801 with a cost of production of Frs. 112,200 and Frs. 6,858,930, and profits of
Frs. 5,100 and Frs. 762,930 respectively. Can we assume from this that in adding
the amount of profit to the cost price (prix de revient) we obtain the sales price?
If so, we can then calculate the percentage return on sales and obtain the above
results. While the percentage grew, it seems that it was still comparatively
smaller than in Britain.
[54] Beside those already mentioned, there are the Gregs of Quarry Bank Mill
(with 5 mills), the Ashworth cotton enterprise (two mills: New Eagley combined
spinning and weaving and Egerton with both spinning and fine spinning), and
the Fildens of Todmorden. Moreover, little data exist about other firms, however
limited in years.
[55] The two mill firm expanded tremendously from 1818 to 1831. Although the
owners were not among the largest fine spinners in the industry, their firm was
renowned for its technical superiority (Boyson 1970: 47). The Gregs wereFlorence Molk 138
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prominent cotton spinners and weavers. We should keep in mind that for the
Gregs the returns consist of profit plus interest on partners’ capital and the rent
paid to Samuel Greg. On the other hand, Ashworth’s returns have deducted
interests. For detailed returns on capital for the Gregs and Ashworths, see Rose
(1986: 53) and Boyson (1970: 18).
[56] The profit for that year is much smaller than the next seven years. Having
no reports on capital invested for those years, we cannot calculate the percentage
returns; nonetheless, we can assume that they were higher than in 1817. While
the profit in 1817 was 6,000 francs, the average profits from 1818 to 1824 were
27,214 francs.
[57] Although there are no more explicit records for M’Connel and Kennedy
after 1809, Lee managed to assess average returns of 9, 8 and 13 percent for the
three-year period 1834-1836 (Lee 1972: 140). Calculation was based on the
valuation of fixed capital. At Hollins and Co., the average return from 1837 and
1839 (despite an economic downturn) amounted to 11.3 percent (Pigot 1949: 72).
As for Fieldens, the average from 1837 to 1840 was of 9.5 percent (Law 1995: 66).
Profit includes both interest, and profit. For yearly profits, see Law (1995: 66,
table VII).
[58] See Law (1995: 66), who comes in with slightly different estimates: “the
Ashworths during this period were averaging 8 to 9 percent and this was the
range Henry Ashworth was to quote to a House of Lords Committee in 1846.
R.H. Greg of Styal was to suggest to the same committee that 7.5 percent was a
representative return.” (But it is unclear what years exactly are referred to in
the 1830’s).
[59] Farnie calculated the “average annual gross return to capital in the cotton
industry” based on pence per lb of cotton consumed as follows: 1850-72, 6.49
percent; 1873-96, 6.16 percent (Farnie 1979: 202, table 10).
[60] Although we do not possess profit rates for the Gregs, we can compare their
results somewhat with those of the Fieldens since mill-margins can serve as an
indicator. Greg’s mill-margins are slightly lower than those of Fieldens’;
however, both follow the same trend: increasing in the second half of the 1850’s,
slightly decreasing in 1861, and again growing between 1863 and 1865 (see Rose
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[61] Boyson reminds us that “it was generally recognized that the larger than
average firm should be more profitable” (Boyson 1970: 69).
[62] According to Farnie: “Mill margins did not return to their level of 1872
until 1904 and reached their nadir during the crisis of 1891-3, when the value of
gross production sank more sharply than in 1873-79, the volume of imports of
raw cotton declined by 29 percent, the value of yarn exports shrank by 26.6
percent and the value of the exports of cotton manufactures to the Far East sank
by 27 percent. Even the favored thread industry suffered a recession in the
volume of its exports between 1889 and 1894. The severity of that particular
depression was clearly manifested in the increase in cut-throat competition”
(1979: 203).
[63] The Baker sample consists of a “changing sample of between 7 and 11
companies entering and leaving the sample.” The companies are: Boston (entry
sample: 1836–exit from sample 1862), Merrimack (1836–1887), Hamilton (1836–
1887), Nashua (1836–1887), Tremont (1836–1866), Suffolk (1836–1866),
Lawrence (1836–1862), Dwight (1843–1887), Naumkeag (1851–1887), Pepperell
(1853–1887), Lyman (1855–1887). The companies, with the exception of
Numkeag, were organized on the Waltham-Lowell type. See McGouldrick (1968:
3-4), who asserts that the Baker sample, although being only a percentage of the
total industry, is fairly representative of middle-large firms of the same type.
[64] McGouldrick calculates the different profit rates as follows: profit to net
worth demonstrates earnings per unit of invested capital; profit to sales evaluates
the share of gross output going to owners of equity capital; return to capital as a
percent of total assets (rate of return to capital) regards the sum of profits; and
interest expense divided by total assets (see 1968: 98-9, 106).
[65] In the same vein, McGouldrick also notices that “Unlike profits to net
worth, profits to sales declined steeply from the 1830’s to the 1880’s. Whether
based on peak-to-peak or trough-to-through averages of whole profit cycles,
earnings per dollar of sales fell by over 40 percent between the first and last
profit cycles. By contrast, there was no downward trend in profits as a percent of
invested capital” (1968: 100).Florence Molk 140
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[66] The firms are: Kanegafuchi, Mie, Fuji Gasu, Settsu, Osaka, Osaka Union,
Japan, Kishiwada, and Amagasaki.
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